BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
150.138.0.0/15
Announced exactly
- 150.138.0.0/15AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI Valid150.138.0.0
- Registry
- APNIC · China · Mar 29, 2011
- Delegated block
- 150.138.0.0 – 150.139.255.255
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 150.138.32.0/20AS139887ChinaNet Shandong Yantai IDC networkRPKI Valid150.138.32.0
- 150.138.64.0/19AS137690Zaozhuang,Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.64.0
- 150.138.64.0/20AS137690Zaozhuang,Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.64.0
- 150.138.85.0/24AS137690Zaozhuang,Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.85.0
- 150.138.88.0/23AS137690Zaozhuang,Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.88.0
- 150.138.89.0/24AS137690Zaozhuang,Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.89.0
- 150.138.92.0/24AS137690Zaozhuang,Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.92.0
- 150.138.93.0/24AS137690Zaozhuang,Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.93.0
- 150.138.96.0/19AS58541Qingdao,266000RPKI Valid150.138.96.0
- 150.138.99.0/24AS136195Qingdao, Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.99.0
- 150.138.112.0/21AS136195Qingdao, Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.112.0
- 150.138.112.0/23AS58541Qingdao,266000RPKI Valid150.138.112.0
- 150.138.114.0/23AS58541Qingdao,266000RPKI Valid150.138.114.0
- 150.138.116.0/22AS58541Qingdao,266000RPKI Valid150.138.116.0
- 150.138.126.0/23AS136195Qingdao, Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.126.0
- 150.138.128.0/19AS58541Qingdao,266000RPKI Valid150.138.128.0
- 150.138.135.0/24AS136195Qingdao, Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.138.135.0
- 150.138.160.0/19AS58541Qingdao,266000RPKI Valid150.138.160.0
- 150.138.192.0/19AS58540Jinan,250000RPKI Valid150.138.192.0
- 150.138.224.0/19AS58540Jinan,250000RPKI Valid150.138.224.0
- 150.139.128.0/19AS136195Qingdao, Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.139.128.0
- 150.139.192.0/19AS136195Qingdao, Shandong Province, P.R.China.RPKI Valid150.139.192.0
- 150.139.192.0/20AS58541Qingdao,266000RPKI Valid150.139.192.0
- 150.139.208.0/20AS58541Qingdao,266000RPKI Valid150.139.208.0
- 150.139.224.0/19AS58540Jinan,250000RPKI Valid150.139.224.0
- 150.139.250.0/24AS58540Jinan,250000RPKI Valid150.139.250.0
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 49.224.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.