BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
2001:fb0::/32
Announced exactly
- 2001:fb0::/32AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI Valid2001:fb0::
- Registry
- APNIC · Thailand · Jan 6, 2004
- Delegated block
- 2001:fb0:: – 2001:fb0:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 2001:fb0:1000::/48AS9287True Internet Data Center Company LimitedRPKI Valid2001:fb0:1000::
- 2001:fb0:1001::/48AS9287True Internet Data Center Company LimitedRPKI Valid2001:fb0:1001::
- 2001:fb0:1002::/48AS9287True Internet Data Center Company LimitedRPKI Valid2001:fb0:1002::
- 2001:fb0:100e::/48AS37992Thammasat University in thailandRPKI Valid2001:fb0:100e::
- 2001:fb0:100f::/48AS37992Thammasat University in thailandRPKI Valid2001:fb0:100f::
- 2001:fb0:101c::/48AS55476CP All Public Co., Ltd.RPKI Valid2001:fb0:101c::
- 2001:fb0:1035::/48AS133167TMB Bank, Phahonyothin branch. ,RPKI Valid2001:fb0:1035::
- 2001:fb0:1056::/48AS396986Bytedance Inc.RPKI Valid2001:fb0:1056::
- 2001:fb0:1064::/48AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI Valid2001:fb0:1064::
- 2001:fb0:1065::/48AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI Valid2001:fb0:1065::
- 2001:fb0:1071::/48AS133761Mr. NaphatRPKI Valid2001:fb0:1071::
- 2001:fb0:1078::/48AS55844142 KASIKORNBANK Building 4th Floor Silom Road Suriyawong Bangrak Bangkok 10500RPKI Valid2001:fb0:1078::
- 2001:fb0:109e::/48AS55476CP All Public Co., Ltd.RPKI Valid2001:fb0:109e::
- 2001:fb0:109f::/48AS7470TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd.RPKI Valid2001:fb0:109f::
- 2001:fb0:10a2::/48AS55451Office of the National Broadcasting andRPKI Valid2001:fb0:10a2::
- 2001:fb0:10b5::/48AS138685Mahidol Wittayanusorn SchoolRPKI Valid2001:fb0:10b5::
- 2001:fb0:10bb::/48AS151825Rangsit UniversityRPKI Valid2001:fb0:10bb::
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 49.224.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.