BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
27.16.128.0/17
Announced exactly
- 27.16.128.0/17AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.128.0
- Registry
- APNIC · China · Mar 18, 2010
- Delegated block
- 27.16.0.0 – 27.31.255.255
Covering routes
- 27.16.0.0/12AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI Not found27.16.0.0
More-specific routes
- 27.16.129.0/24AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.129.0
- 27.16.130.0/23AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.130.0
- 27.16.132.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.132.0
- 27.16.144.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.144.0
- 27.16.148.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.148.0
- 27.16.152.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.152.0
- 27.16.160.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.160.0
- 27.16.172.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.172.0
- 27.16.180.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.180.0
- 27.16.184.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.184.0
- 27.16.188.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.188.0
- 27.16.196.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.196.0
- 27.16.200.0/21AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.200.0
- 27.16.208.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.208.0
- 27.16.212.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.212.0
- 27.16.216.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.216.0
- 27.16.220.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.220.0
- 27.16.224.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.224.0
- 27.16.232.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.232.0
- 27.16.236.0/22AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.236.0
- 27.16.252.0/24AS137266CHINATELECOM Hubei province Wuhan 5G networkRPKI Valid27.16.252.0
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 49.224.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.