BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
2a00:b440::/32
Announced exactly
- 2a00:b440::/32AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440::
- Registry
- RIPE NCC · Russia · Mar 7, 2012
- Delegated block
- 2a00:b440:: – 2a00:b440:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 2a00:b440:20::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:20::
- 2a00:b440:24::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:24::
- 2a00:b440:70::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:70::
- 2a00:b440:74::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:74::
- 2a00:b440:88::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:88::
- 2a00:b440:8c::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:8c::
- 2a00:b440:90::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:90::
- 2a00:b440:94::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:94::
- 2a00:b440:98::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:98::
- 2a00:b440:9c::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:9c::
- 2a00:b440:a0::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:a0::
- 2a00:b440:a4::/46AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:a4::
- 2a00:b440:c00::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:c00::
- 2a00:b440:e00::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:e00::
- 2a00:b440:3400::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:3400::
- 2a00:b440:3600::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:3600::
- 2a00:b440:4000::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:4000::
- 2a00:b440:4200::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:4200::
- 2a00:b440:4400::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:4400::
- 2a00:b440:4600::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:4600::
- 2a00:b440:4800::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:4800::
- 2a00:b440:4a00::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:4a00::
- 2a00:b440:4c00::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:4c00::
- 2a00:b440:4e00::/39AS12389PJSC RostelecomRPKI Valid2a00:b440:4e00::
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 49.224.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.